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I. INTRODUCTION 
With the Supreme Court’s recognition of same-sex marriage in 
Obergefell v. Hodges1 in 2015, wedding vendors with religious objections 
were placed in a predicament—violate their religious beliefs by 
participating in same-sex weddings or face potential legal consequences 
* J.D. Candidate at the University of Akron School of Law. I would like to thank Dean and C. Blake 
McDowell, Jr. Professor of Law Christopher J. “C.J.” Peters for his generous guidance and support 
throughout the writing process and Akron Law Review Associate Editor Ethan Peters for his editorial 
assistance. I would also like to thank my wife and daughter for their love, patience, and support while 
I worked on this project. 
1. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015). 
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for refusing. Several wedding vendors including bakers,2 florists,3 
photographers,4 venue owners,5 and others6 were taken to court when they 
refused to serve same-sex weddings on religious grounds.7 The vendors 
2. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018);
See also Klein v. Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 410 P.3d 1051, 1051 (Or. Ct. App. 2017), rev’d., 139 
S. Ct. 2713 (2019) (vacating and remanding to the Court of Appeals of Oregon to be considered in 
light of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n); Steven Mayer, The state wants 
its cake in second major legal action against Tastries Bakery, BAKERSFIELD CALIFORNIAN (Oct. 25, 
2018), https://www.bakersfield.com/news/the-state-wants-its-cake-in-second-major-legal-action/
article_019e7900-d8a1-11e8-a082-772b8114b114.html [https://perma.cc/R8ZN-5TVF] (providing 
timeline of events for the legal action against a Bakersfield, California bakery). 
3. See State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 193 Wash.2d 469 (Wash. 2019) (reaffirming previous
decision after remand from United States Supreme Court), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Sept. 11, 
2019) (No. 19-333); Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Wash., 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018) (vacating and remanding 
to the Supreme Court of Washington to be considered in light of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v Colo. 
Civil Rights Comm’n).  
4. See Telescope Media Grp. v. Lindsey, 271 F. Supp. 3d 1090 (D. Minn. 2017) (granting
same-sex couple’s motion to dismiss), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 
936 F.3d, 740, 762 (8th Cir. 2019) (reversing the district court’s dismissal and allowing the 
videographer’s case to proceed as a hybrid claim of freedom of speech and free exercise of religion); 
Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013) (holding that freedom of speech and 
free exercise of religion did not allow photography business to discriminate against same-sex couple), 
cert. denied, Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 572 U.S. 1046 (2014); Amy Lynn Photography 
Studio, LLC v. City of Madison, NO. 2017-CV-000555 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Aug. 23, 2017) (granting 
declaratory judgment that photography studio does not fall within the definition of a place of public 
accommodation in the State of Wisconsin’s and the City of Madison’s anti-discrimination statutes). 
5. See Knapp v. City of Coeur D’Alene, 172 F. Supp. 3d 1118 (D. Idaho 2016) (dismissing,
in part, for lack of standing on wedding venue owner’s pre-enforcement complaint that anti-
discrimination statute violates Free Exercise Clause); Matter of Gifford v. McCarthy, 23 N.Y.S.3d 
422 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (affirming State Division of Human Rights determination that venue 
owners had violated the Human Rights Law); Odgaard v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, No. 
CVCV046451 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Apr. 3, 2014) (dismissing gallery owners’ verified petition that 
complaint by same-sex couple chilled their freedom of speech to express their religious beliefs against 
same-sex marriage on their venue’s website); See also Wathen v. Walder Vacuflo, Inc., No. 2011-
SP-2488, No. 2011-SP-2489 (Ill. Human Rights Comm’n. Mar. 22, 2016) (requiring bed and 
breakfast owner to facilitate same-sex marriage or civil union ceremonies when opposite-sex 
ceremonies were allowed); Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n, No. PN34XB-03008 
(N.J. Div. of Civil Rights Oct. 22, 2012) (finding Methodist Association violated anti-discrimination 
statute when it denied a same-sex couple use of its property for their civil union ceremony); Ros 
Krasny, Lesbian brides win settlement from Vermont inn, REUTERS (Aug. 24, 2012), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-lesbians-vermont/lesbian-brides-win-settlement-from-
vermont-inn-idUSLNE87N00I20120824?feedType=RSS [https://perma.cc/ZK3W-HRBG] (Inn 
owners settled with same-sex couple and Vermont Human Rights Commission and had to pay 
$30,000 in damages). 
6. See Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 448 P.3d 890, 895–96, 926 (Ariz. 2019)
(holding that the City of Phoenix’s ordinance as applied to the plaintiff’s creation of custom wedding 
invitations violated article 2, section 6 of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona’s Free Exercise of 
Religion Act).  
7. See Alexandra McPhee, Religious Liberty and the “Wedding Vendor” Cases, CTR. FOR 
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claimed protection by the Free Exercise Clause.8 The first of these cases 
to make it to the United States Supreme Court was Masterpiece Cakeshop, 
Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission where a Colorado baker refused 
to make a custom wedding cake for a same-sex wedding.9 The baker’s 
free exercise claims had been denied by both the Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission and the Colorado Court of Appeals, and religious wedding 
vendors across the country prayed the Supreme Court would 
accommodate their religious beliefs.10 
On the other side of the issue were same-sex couples who had just 
had their right to marry recognized across the country. Now they faced 
the indignity of being refused service. Anti-discrimination laws like the 
one in Colorado that protected from discrimination based on sexual 
orientation were meant to protect this dignity, but many believed the laws 
also infringed on the religious beliefs of others.11 These two competing 
interests—sexual orientation and religious beliefs—represented the core 
identities of the parties.12 This created a particularly heated public debate. 
Both sides viewed Masterpiece Cakeshop as the opportunity to settle the 
issue and protect their rights. 
When the Supreme Court released its opinion in the case, neither side 
got what they wanted. The Court issued a narrow opinion avoiding the 
overall issue of whether the Free Exercise Clause allowed religious 
accommodations to anti-discrimination laws by finding animus toward the 
baker by members of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission.13 With the 
question still unanswered, the attention of both sides turned to other 
potential cases that might solve the issue. 
In this paper, I will argue that while the Court’s holding in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop was narrow, it actually suggests a much broader 
solution than the Court was able to provide—legislative accommodations 
rooted in tolerance that protect the dignity of same-sex couples and 
respect sincere religious beliefs. Part I will review the history of 
8. U.S. CONST. amend I.
9. 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1720 (2018). 
10. Id. at 1725–26. 
11. Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-601(2)(a) (West 2017). 
12. Thomas C. Berg, Masterpiece Cakeshop: A Romer for Religious Objectors?, 2017–2018 
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 139, 162 (arguing for heightened scrutiny for both sexual orientation 
discrimination and free exercise of religion as both are “an essential component of personhood”); 
Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 839, 877 (2014) 
[hereinafter Culture Wars]; Thomas C. Berg, What Same-Sex-Marriage and Religious-Liberty Claims 
Have in Common, 5 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 206, 212–27 (2010) [hereinafter Claims Have in 
Common]; William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of “Coming Out”: Religion, Homosexuality, 
and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2411, 2416–30 (1997).  
13. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1731. 
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legislative accommodations of religion and show how there are more 
examples of legislative accommodations than judicial accommodations. 
Part II will dissect the decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop and show how 
the Court used dicta to provide a formula for legislative accommodations. 
Part III will discuss how legislative accommodations are more appropriate 
than judicial accommodations. Part IV will analyze different approaches 
to accommodations that have been enacted or proposed. Finally, Part V 
will show how current and future issues can be solved by legislative 
accommodations. This paper will contend that legislative 
accommodations that respect both sides are the best way to balance these 
interests. 
II. HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF LEGISLATIVE ACCOMMODATIONS OF
RELIGION 
When a law has the unintended consequence of requiring a person to 
act or refrain from acting in a way that is contrary to his religious beliefs, 
the legislature may choose to allow an accommodation for that belief. 
However, accommodations are not always given nor required. 
Recognizing the need to protect the role of religion in a person’s life, 
the people ratified the First Amendment which begins, “Congress shall 
make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof.”14 This ensured that laws directly affecting a 
person’s religion are not allowed. However, it did not define what should 
be accommodated under laws that indirectly affect a person’s religion. 
Both legislatures and courts have struggled with where exactly to draw 
the line to determine what gets accommodated. This section will look at 
some of the early debates and accommodations in American history. It 
will review the Supreme Court’s treatment of claims under the Free 
Exercise Clause. And it will examine the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act’s general approach to religious accommodations. 
A. Religious Accommodations in Early American History 
The question of whether accommodations can or should be made for 
religious objections to laws has been asked since colonial times. Many 
prominent leaders during the colonial period, including Roger Williams, 
William Cotton, William Penn, and John Leland, had opinions on when 
accommodations were appropriate. In practice, many of the colonies 
enacted specific legislative accommodations of religion between the late-
14. U.S. CONST. amend I.
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1600s and the late-1700s. These accommodations involved religious 
assessments, military conscription, and the requirement of oaths. The first 
judicial accommodation of religion did not come until 1813. 
In the mid-1600s, Roger Williams, the founder of the Rhode Island 
colony, debated the issue of religious accommodations with John Cotton. 
A staunch supporter of the freedom of conscience, Williams believed that 
government did not have authority over a person’s religious practice. 
Cotton argued that denying the government the authority to regulate 
religious conduct would undermine the authority of the government in 
secular areas.15 The point of their disagreement centered on the difficulty 
of distinguishing between religious practice and secular conduct, as the 
two are often somewhat blended. To provide a religious believer the 
ability to disobey laws that were contrary to his religious belief is to 
dismantle the structure of an ordered society by allowing the disobedience 
of any secular laws that blended with religious action. There must be a 
balance between accommodations and maintaining the rule of law. 
Attempting to identify what type of laws should receive religious 
accommodations, William Penn, the founder of Pennsylvania, argued that 
accommodations must “preserve[] the Nation in Peace, Trade, and 
Commerce . . . .” Penn would not provide accommodations to “those 
excellent Laws, that tend to Sober, Just and Industrious Living.”16 While 
this distinction shows that Penn believed there are times that 
accommodations are necessary and there are times when accommodations 
are inappropriate, it is still far from certain which accommodations would 
be allowed or which laws would be eligible for accommodations. 
A century later, John Leland, leader of the Virginia Baptists during 
the Revolutionary Era, believed that laws were to be obeyed. “[B]ut when 
a man is a peacable subject of the state, he should be protected in 
worshipping the Deity according to the dictates of his own conscience.”17 
Leland’s distinction that accommodations should be allowed when a man 
is a peaceable subject of the state did not provide much more clarity. 
15. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1447 (1990) (citing THOMAS CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: 
CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 18 (1986)). See 
Timothy L. Hall, Roger Williams and the Foundations of Religious Liberty, 71 B.U. L. REV. 455 
(1991) (defining and applying the four decades of theory on religious freedom penned by Roger 
Williams to modern debate). 
16. McConnell, supra note 15, at 1447–48 (quoting William Penn, The Great Case of Liberty 
of Conscience, 1 A COLLECTION OF THE WORKS OF WILLIAM PENN 457 (London 1726)). 
17. Id. at 1448 (quoting John Leland, The Yankee Spy, THE WRITINGS OF THE LATE ELDER 
JOHN LELAND 213, 228 (G. W. Wood ed., 1845)). 
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Colonial leaders had difficulty articulating a theory about exactly 
when religious accommodations should be granted. They recognized that 
accommodations to laws hindered the order of their society but believed 
that free exercise of religion required obedience to God above all else. 
This difficulty persists today as the question of where to draw the line is 
still being debated. 
Despite the difficulty articulating a precise theory, the colonies did 
enact legislative accommodations for religious assessments, military 
conscription, and requirements of oaths proving that legislative 
accommodations of religion are an available option. Prior to the 
Revolutionary War, many of the colonies had established religions and 
required religious assessments, a form of a tax, to support the established 
church. Between the late-1600s and mid-1700s, Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Virginia passed different forms of 
legislative accommodations allowing those who opposed the established 
church to refrain from paying the assessments.18 Some only 
accommodated certain denominations and others required the objector to 
pay the assessment to the church of their choice instead.19 
While the accommodation for religious assessments focused on a 
clearly religious issue, the next two categories of accommodations were 
secular in nature. The issue of mandatory military conscription 
encroached on the beliefs of Quakers, Mennonites, and other minority 
sects against bearing arms. Maryland, North Carolina, and Rhode Island 
passed legislative accommodations before 1700 that exempted those with 
religious beliefs opposing military service from the requirement.20 
Pennsylvania, which did not have a militia until 1755, avoided the issue 
of religious accommodations by making their militia voluntary.21 In the 
mid-1700s, New York, Massachusetts, and Virginia created an 
accommodation for those who were religiously opposed to military 
conscription but required the objector to pay a fee or send a substitute. 
New Hampshire’s law specifically accommodated Quakers.22 When the 
Revolutionary War broke out, the Continental Congress passed a 
18. Id. at 1469.
19. Laura Underkuffler-Freund, The Separation of the Religious and the Secular: A
Foundational Challenge to First Amendment Theory, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 837, 883 (1995); 
McConnell, supra note 15, at 1469. 
20. McConnell, supra note 15, at 1468. See also Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of 
Religious Behavior and the Original Understanding of the Establishment Clause, 81 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1793, 1807–08 (2006) [hereinafter Regulatory Exemptions of Religious Behavior] (discussing 
the religious accommodation in Rhode Island’s military conscription law enacted in 1673). 
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resolution accommodating those with religious objections to fighting 
from having to obey the requirement for military service and urged them 
“to contribute liberally . . . and to do all other services to their oppressed 
Country, which they can consistently with their religious principles.”23 
The third category of religious accommodations involved the oath 
requirement. Oaths were the primary method used to ensure integrity and 
honesty in colonial courts and other aspects of society. Quakers and other 
groups had sincere religious objections to swearing oaths that hindered 
their ability to take part in the court system. Between 1669 and the 1780s, 
nearly all of the colonies passed legislative accommodations to the oath 
requirement substituting some other form of pledge or affirmation 
instead.24 
The first case of a judicial accommodation of religion came from a 
New York state court in 1813 and provided what we know today as the 
priest-penitent privilege.25 In People v. Phillips, Daniel Phillips 
knowingly received stolen goods and confessed this sin to his priest, 
Father Kohlmann. Kohlmann advised Phillips to return the goods and 
offered to deliver the goods to the rightful owner. Kohlmann was 
subpoenaed to identify the guilty party before a grand jury. Kohlmann 
declared that revealing the details of a confession would make him “a 
traitor to my church, to my sacred ministry and to my God” with the result 
being “eternal damnation.”26 
The court ruled that Kohlmann could not be required to break the 
confidentiality of the confessional. To do so would be to “annihilate” this 
sacrament of the Catholic religion.27 The court stated that everyone would 
agree that it would be unacceptable to do something similar to the 
23. Id. at 1468–69 (quoting Resolution of July 18, 1775, 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL 
CONGRESS, 1774–1789, 187, 189 (W. Ford ed. 1905)).  
24. Regulatory Exemptions of Religious Behavior, supra note 20, at 1804–05; McConnell,
supra note 15, at 1767–68. See also David E. Steinberg, Rejecting the Case Against the Free Exercise 
Exemption: A Critical Assessment, 75 B.U. L. REV. 241, 266–267 (2005) (discussing early state 
constitutional provisions in Maryland and South Carolina exempting certain religions from swearing 
testimonial oaths). 
25. Walter J. Walsh, The First Free Exercise Case, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 1 (2004)
(providing an in-depth analysis of the importance and the impact of this case on current debate about 
free exercise accommodations); McConnell, supra note 15, at 1410–12 (citing W. Sampson, THE 
CATHOLIC QUESTION IN AMERICA 8–9 (1813); Privileged Communications to Clergymen, 1 CATH. 
LAW. 199, 199–209 (1955)). 
26. Walsh, supra note 25, at 20–21; McConnell, supra note 15, at 1410–11 (quoting W.
Sampson, CATHOLIC QUESTION IN AMERICA 8–9 (1813)). 
27. McConnell, supra note 15, at 1504 (quoting Privileged Communications to Clergymen, 1
CATH. LAW. 199, 207 (1955)). 
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Protestant religion, and to maintain neutrality among beliefs, the court 
must extend the same protection to Catholics.28 
Four years later, another New York court distinguished the Phillips 
case from a case involving a Protestant confession because enforcing the 
subpoena did not violate tenets of that religion. In response, the New York 
state legislature passed a legislative accommodation protecting the 
confidentiality of a confession for all denominations.29 
B. The Supreme Court’s Treatment of Free Exercise Claims for 
Accommodation 
1. The Pre-Sherbert Era
The first time the Supreme Court dealt with the issue of religious 
accommodations under the Free Exercise Clause was in 1879. In Reynolds 
v. United States, a Mormon man claimed that a federal law prohibiting
polygamy in United States territories violated his religious requirement of 
having multiple wives.30 In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court 
denied the Free Exercise claim.31 
In Reynolds, the Court recognized a distinction between regulating 
opinion and actions—Congress had power to regulate certain actions but 
was powerless over opinion.32 The Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment was widely accepted as protective of religious opinion.33 
However, the Court feared extending that protection to actions would 
“make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the 
land” and would make effectual government non-existent.34 
28. Id. at 1504–05. See also Walsh, supra note 25, at 37–38 (providing another description of
Mayor Clinton’s unanimous decision in the case). 
29. McConnell, supra note 15, at 1505–06 (citing People v. Phillips (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813) 
(unpublished) (reprinted in Privileged Communications to Clergymen, 1 CATH. LAW. 199, 209 
(1955))). 
30. 98 U.S. 145, 161–62 (1879). 
31. Id. at 167. 
32. Id. at 164. See also id. at 162–64. After a historical review of James Madison’s “Memorial 
and Remonstrance,” Thomas Jefferson’s bill for “Establishing Religious Freedom” in the Virginia 
House of Delegates prior to the passage of the Bill of Rights, and Jefferson’s letter to the Danbury 
Baptist Association in response to the adoption of the First Amendment, the Court declared, “Coming 
as this does from an acknowledged leader of the advocates of the measure, it may be accepted almost 
as an authoritative declaration of the scope and effect of the [First A]mendment thus secured. 
Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions 
which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order.” 
33. Id. at 164. 
34. Id. at 166–67. 
9
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In 1940, the Supreme Court applied the Free Exercise Clause to the 
states in Cantwell v. Connecticut.35 The defendant, a Jehovah’s Witness, 
was convicted of violating a state ordinance prohibiting the solicitation of 
anything of value for a religious, charitable, or philanthropic cause 
without a license. In order to obtain a license, the statute required the 
person to prove to the secretary of the public welfare council that their 
cause was “a religious one or is a bona fide object of charity or 
philanthropy.”36 The Court held that the state placing general limits on 
solicitation without granting religious accommodations would not violate 
the Free Exercise Clause, but requiring a license given at the discretion of 
a state official to disseminate religious views was unconstitutional. This 
judgment decision by the state could result in targeted censorship of 
religious views: the possibility of which violated the protections of the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments.37 
The Court reiterated the dual nature of the Free Exercise Clause—
the freedom to believe and the freedom to act. “The first is absolute but, 
in the nature of things, the second cannot be.”38 While the Court in 
Cantwell recognized the freedom to act on religious beliefs had limits, it 
found that the state had overreached those limits in requiring a license to 
solicit religious materials. Over the next five years, the Court repeatedly 
struck down licenses and taxes directed at solicitation of religious 
material.39 
2. The Sherbert Test—Compelling Government Interest
In the 1963 case Sherbert v. Verner, a Seventh-day Adventist lost her 
job when she could not work on Saturdays, the Sabbath according to her 
religious beliefs. She was unable to find other work due to this limitation. 
Her unemployment compensation benefits were denied because she 
35. 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
36. Id. at 301–02. 
37. Id. at 305–07.
38. Id. at 303–04; Id. at 304 n.4 (citing Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 145); See Davis v. Beason, 133
U.S. 333 (1890) (upholding an Idaho Territory law forbidding those who practice or advocate bigamy 
or polygamy from registering to vote).  
39. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (striking down a license tax applied to 
Jehovah’s Witness soliciting and distributing literature door-to-door); Follett v. Town of McCormick, 
321 U.S. 573 (1944) (declaring the city’s occupational tax on book salesman was invalid as applied 
to a Jehovah’s Witness minister who made his living solely on the religious books he sold door-to-
door). Contra Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (upholding child labor laws prohibiting 
children from selling merchandise on the street when the child is used for street preaching and 
solicitation of religious materials).  
10
Akron Law Review, Vol. 53 [2019], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol53/iss1/6
2019] MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP 187 
refused to accept jobs that required she work on Saturdays.40 She sued 
alleging that the state’s denial of unemployment benefits prohibited her 
free exercise of religion in violation of the First Amendment’s Free 
Exercise Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment.41 
In ruling for the plaintiff, the Supreme Court held that laws 
restricting the exercise of religion must pass strict scrutiny to be valid.42 
This test, known as the Sherbert Test, required that if the person has a 
claim involving a sincerely held religious belief and if the government’s 
action imposes any burden on the free exercise of the plaintiff’s religion, 
the government must show that there is a compelling government interest 
justifying the infringement and that the government has pursued that 
interest using the least-restrictive and least-burdensome means.43 This 
required the plaintiff to show their exercise of religion was hindered by 
the government then shifted the burden to the government to show the 
existence of a compelling state interest.44 The Court pointed out that areas 
of compelling state interests are historically those that “posed some 
substantial threat to public safety, peace or order.”45 
Even though strict scrutiny was required for laws to overcome the 
Free Exercise Clause under Sherbert, the only laws that were struck down 
after that decision were those involving unemployment benefits46 and 
compulsory school attendance of fourteen and fifteen-year olds.47 When 
challenged on free exercise grounds, the Court upheld Sunday closing 
40. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399–401 (1963). 
41. Id. at 401. See also Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303 (incorporating the First Amendment). 
42. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406. 
43. Id. at 402–03, 406–07. 
44. Id. at 407. 
45. Id. at 403 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 145 (1879); Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (protecting public health and safety through mandatory smallpox 
violations); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (promoting public safety by prohibiting 
children from selling merchandise on the street); Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946) 
(protecting women from transportation across state lines for an immoral purpose included 
polygamy)).  
46. Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (allowing appellant who was a
Christian but not a member of any religious sect to be eligible for unemployment compensation when 
he turned down a job requiring him to work on Sundays); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals 
Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (allowing a Seventh-Day Adventist who was discharged for 
misconduct for refusing to work on Saturdays to receive unemployment compensation); Thomas v. 
Review Bd. Of Ind. Emp’t. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (allowing a Jehovah’s Witness to receive 
unemployment compensation when he quit his job after being transferred to a unit building tank turrets 
because his religious beliefs would not allow him to build armaments for war). 
47. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972) (permitting Amish families who opposed
high school education of their children as contrary to their religious beliefs to have an exemption to 
Wisconsin’s compulsory education laws which required children to attend school until age sixteen).  
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laws,48 laws restricting conscientious objectors to those who object to all 
war,49 the obligation to pay taxes,50 IRS requirements of racial 
nondiscrimination policies for tax-exempt status,51 military dress code 
forbidding yarmulke on duty,52 the requirement of listing social security 
numbers to apply for welfare benefits,53 and the ability of the government 
to build a road and harvest timber in a national park that contained ancient 
Indian burial grounds.54 Even under strict scrutiny, the Court was very 
unwilling to provide judicial accommodations for religion. 
3. Employment Division v. Smith’s Current Case Law
In 1990, the Supreme Court decided Employment Division v. Smith.55 
This case involved two members of the Native American Church who 
were fired from their jobs for ingesting peyote, a Schedule I controlled 
substance, as part of a religious ceremony. When the men filed for 
unemployment compensation, their claims were denied because their jobs 
were terminated for “misconduct.” They filed suit claiming a violation of 
the Free Exercise Clause.56 
In the opinion, the Court discussed their past reluctance to recognize 
free exercise claims for accommodation and classified the claims they did 
recognize as “hybrid” claims which combined the free exercise of religion 
with some other recognized right.57 The Supreme Court abandoned the 
48. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (denying facial and as-applied challenges to 
the Sunday closing laws by an Orthodox Jews who practiced Saturday Sabbath and claimed the forced 
closure on Sundays caused them to economic disadvantages due to their religious beliefs). 
49. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (holding that separate petitioners, one a 
Catholic and one a Humanist, did not qualify for a religious accommodation from the military draft 
as conscientious objectors as they only objected to the Vietnam War and not all wars as the law 
required). 
50. See Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378 (1990)
(requiring religious groups to pay sales tax on the goods and literature they sold); Tony and Susan 
Alamo Found. v. Sec. of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985) (requiring religious foundation to pay minimum 
wage); United States v. Lee, 45 U.S. 252 (1982) (requiring Amish to pay Social Security taxes). 
51. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (removing tax-exempt status 
from religious private university for racial discrimination in admissions). 
52. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). 
53. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (holding that the requirement of listing a social
security number to obtain welfare benefits did not violate the Native American’s religious belief that 
using his daughter’s social security number on the application would “rob her soul”). 
54. See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
55. Emp’t. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 872 (1990). 
56. Id. at 874. 
57. Id. at 881–82 (classifying Cantwell v. Connecticut, Murdock v. Pennsylvania, and Follett 
v. McCormick as hybrids of free exercise and freedom of speech and press and classifying Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters and Wisconsin v. Yoder as hybrids of free exercise and right of parents to dictate the 
upbringing of their children).  
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Sherbert Test and its requirement of a compelling government interest and 
declared that any effect on the free exercise of religion by neutral, 
generally applicable laws does not violate the Free Exercise Clause.58 
Under this analysis, the Court denied the free exercise claim as Oregon’s 
prohibition of peyote was neutral and generally applicable.59 The Court 
reasoned that requiring the political process to create any desired 
accommodations to generally applicable laws is favored over allowing 
individuals or judges to create exemptions of their own volition.60 
In 1993, the Court applied Smith and unanimously struck down a 
municipal ordinance that outlawed ritualistic animal sacrifices in Church 
of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah.61 The City of Hialeah, Florida, 
had become concerned when members of the Santeria religion, who 
practice ritualistic animal sacrifices as part of their faith, announced the 
establishment of a church in the city.62 The city council held emergency 
public meetings and adopted resolutions articulating the council’s 
commitment to protecting the public from “any and all religious groups 
which are inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety.”63 After 
consultation regarding the city’s authority to adopt animal cruelty 
measures, the council crafted and adopted ordinances written to 
specifically prohibit the Santeria animal sacrifices.64 
The Supreme Court found that, while neutral on its face, the 
ordinance was not neutral in application. The ordinance was written with 
the motivation and effect of prohibiting the religious exercise of the 
church.65 It was both too broad as it regulated more than was needed to 
satisfy the city’s interest in protecting public health, and it was also too 
narrow because it only regulated the practices of the Santeria religion 
while leaving similar public health issues unregulated. 66 The ordinance 
fell well below the standard for general applicability as it targeted the 
specific practices of the church.67 Because the ordinance was neither 
neutral nor generally applicable, it was subject to strict scrutiny. The 
58. Id. at 878–80, 889. 
59. Id. at 890. 
60. Id.
61. 508 U.S. 520, 527 (1993).
62. Id. at 525–26. 
63. Id. at 526.
64. Id. at 527–28. 
65. Id. at 545. 
66. Id. at 543–45. 
67. Id. at 543–46. 
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Court determined that targeting a religion is not a compelling government 
interest and, even if it was, the ordinances were not narrowly tailored.68 
Currently, under Smith and Lukumi, the Free Exercise Clause does 
not protect religious practices that are affected by neutral, generally 
applicable laws.69 However, laws that target religious belief or practices 
must meet strict scrutiny which requires the government prove that the 
law is necessary to achieve a compelling government interest and that the 
law is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.70 This is the baseline 
protection of the free exercise of religion under the First Amendment. 
Legislatures may adopt religious accommodation laws that provide 
stricter standards for the protection of religious practices. That is just what 
Congress did in response to Smith. 
C. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act’s General Religious 
Accommodation 
To provide a general religious accommodation, Congress passed the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in 1993 with the purpose to 
“restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner” as 
Smith “virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify 
burdens on religious exercise.”71 RFRA provides that any law affecting 
the free exercise of religion must meet strict scrutiny regardless of 
whether it is neutral and generally applicable.72 This requirement applied 
to all branches and levels of government—federal, state, and local.73 
Congress recognized that neutral laws have the ability to burden free 
exercise of religion just as much as laws that target religious exercise.74 
RFRA was introduced to provide stronger protections and greater 
accommodations for the exercise of religion. It received overwhelming 
support and passed nearly unanimously.75 
In 1997, the Supreme Court severely limited the effect of RFRA. In 
City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court held that Congress had exceeded its 
enforcement power in § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when it enacted 
RFRA.76 Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the 
68. Id. at 546–47. 
69. Emp’t. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–80, 889 (1990). 
70. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546–47. 
71. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-104, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993). 
72. Id. at 1488–89. 
73. Id. at 1489. 
74. Id. at 1488. 
75. H.R. 1308, 103rd Cong. (1993–1994).
76. 521 U.S. 507, 511, 536 (1997). 
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authority to enforce the rights granted by that amendment against 
infringement by the states and local governments.77 The Court deemed 
this enforcement power to be “remedial.”78 This remedial enforcement 
allowed Congress to enact laws that protected rights guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment such as the Free Exercise Clause. However, the 
enforcement power did not give Congress the ability to redefine or 
broaden Constitutional rights.79 The Court found that RFRA attempted to 
broaden the protections of the Free Exercise Clause as defined in Smith 
which was outside the scope of Congress’ power.80 This decision in 
Boerne made RFRA only applicable to the federal government reinstating 
the Smith rule for state and local cases. As of 2015, 21 states have adopted 
their own version of RFRA which provides similar protections at the state 
and local level of government.81 
The most well-known case to use RFRA to uphold a free exercise 
claim was Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.82 In 2014, the owners of 
three closely-held corporations challenged a United States Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) mandate issued after enactment of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) that required 
corporations to provide health insurance that included all FDA-approved 
contraceptive methods.83 The petitioners argued that the requirement 
violated their sincerely held religious beliefs regarding the beginning of 
human life as four of the required contraceptives prevented the 
development of an already fertilized egg. The Supreme Court held that 
while the government had a compelling interest in ensuring adequate 
77. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article.”). 
78. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519 (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966)). 
79. Id. at 519. 
80. Id. at 511, 536. 
81. Kathleen A. Brady, Law and Religion in an Increasingly Polarized America: The
Disappearance of Religion from Debates about Religious Accommodation, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 1093, 1095 (2017) (citing Culture Wars, supra note 12, at 845 & n. 26); State Religious Freedom 
Restoration Acts, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (May 4, 2017), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/33ZS-XBBJ] (listing the states that have passed statutes similar to the federal 
RFRA: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia); see also Federal & State RFRA Map, BECKET, 
https://www.becketlaw.org/research-central/rfra-info-central/map/ [https://perma.cc/EB79-3FP6] 
(noting that in addition to these, nine states have provisions in their state constitutions requiring strict 
scrutiny for free exercise claims: Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin). 
82. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
83. Id. at 2762. 
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health care, the numerous exemptions and alternatives offered to other 
groups showed that the requirement in this case was not the least-
restrictive means of achieving that interest.84 The Hobby Lobby case is 
illustrative of how legislative accommodations can provide stronger 
protections for those claiming the law has infringed on the free exercise 
of religion. 
III. MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP’S FORMULA FOR LEGISLATIVE
ACCOMMODATIONS 
A. The Narrow Holding in Masterpiece Cakeshop 
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission, a same-sex couple entered a bakery to order a cake for their 
upcoming wedding. The owner of the bakery, Jack Phillips, refused to 
design them a custom cake for their wedding. He offered to sell them other 
cakes or goods but does not bake cakes for same-sex weddings due to his 
religious beliefs opposing same-sex marriage.85 
The couple filed a complaint under the Colorado Anti-
Discrimination Act (CADA) with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission 
claiming discrimination by Phillips.86 CADA provides, “It is a 
discriminatory practice and unlawful for a person, directly or indirectly, 
to refuse, withhold from, or deny to any individual or a group, because 
of . . . sexual orientation, . . . the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, 
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of a place 
of public accommodation.”87 Phillips claimed that requiring him to design 
and bake a cake for a same-sex wedding would violate his First 
Amendment freedom of speech as an artist and violate his free exercise of 
religion.88 Colorado does not have a state version of the RFRA which 
would subject CADA to strict scrutiny.89 Because the federal Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act was held not to apply to the states in City of 
Boerne90 and Colorado does not have its own version, CADA is subject 
to the rational basis standard set forth in Smith. 
84. Id. at 2781–82.
85. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1724 (2018). 
86. Id. at 1725. 
87. Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-601(2)(a) (West 2019). 
88. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1726. 
89. See supra note 81 (listing the states that have statutes or constitutional provisions requiring 
strict scrutiny for free exercise claims). 
90. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511, 536 (1997). 
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The Commission rejected the baker’s Constitutional claims and ruled 
for the couple. They found that, under Employment Division v. Smith, 
CADA was a “valid and neutral law of general applicability” that did not 
violate the Free Exercise Clause.91 The Commission ordered Phillips to 
“cease and desist from discriminating against . . . same-sex couples by 
refusing to sell them wedding cakes or any product [he] would sell to 
heterosexual couples,” to conduct staff trainings on the requirements of 
CADA and to complete quarterly reports for two years indicating any time 
a customer was denied service.92 Phillips appealed to the Colorado Court 
of Appeals which affirmed the ruling.93 The Colorado Supreme Court 
denied to hear the case.94 
When the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, Phillips’s 
strongest argument seemed to be based on the freedom of speech or a 
“hybrid claim” between freedom of speech and free exercise. Indeed, 
much of the briefing and oral argument in favor of Phillips revolved 
around whether baking a custom wedding cake was an expression or 
speech.95 Under Smith, it would be difficult for Phillips to overcome this 
neutral and generally applicable law on strictly a free exercise claim. 
The case was expected to have major ramifications. If the Court 
decided in favor of the couple, it would limit the freedom of speech and 
free exercise of religion and compel a person to act in opposition to their 
religious beliefs. If the Court decided in favor of the baker, it would limit 
the effect of anti-discrimination laws, allow numerous other types of 
business owners to discriminate, and demean the dignity of same-sex 
couples throughout the country.96 Either way, both sides viewed the final 
result to be a potential winner-take-all scenario. 
91. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1726. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 1726–27. 
94. Id. at 1727. 
95. See Brief for Petitioners, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138
S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No 16-111); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No 16-111) 
[hereinafter Brief for the United States] (declining to even make the free exercise argument in the 
brief); Transcript of Oral Argument, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 
S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No 16-111) [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument]. 
96. See Julie Moreau, Analysis: Masterpiece Cakeshop case could have ‘tremendous 
implications’, NBC NEWS (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/analysis-
masterpiece-cakeshop-case-could-have-tremendous-implications-n826951 [https://perma.cc/Q945-
HPNZ]; Henry Gass, Religious liberty or right to discriminate? High court to hear arguments in 
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Instead of answering the question of whether CADA required 
Phillips to create the custom cake in opposition to his religious beliefs, the 
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Colorado Court of Appeals 
because it found that commissioners on the Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission had exhibited animosity toward the baker’s religion.97 The 
Court pointed out other cases where the commission rejected 
discrimination claims when bakers refused to make cakes that opposed 
same-sex persons or marriages.98 The Court also pointed to what it 
interpreted to be outright animus toward Phillips’s religious beliefs by the 
commissioners during public hearings.99 One commissioner claimed that 
religion had been used to justify slavery and the holocaust and that 
religion is “one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can 
use.”100 
The Court cited the Free Exercise Clause’s protection from “subtle 
departures from neutrality”101 and relied on its decision in Church of 
Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah to find that the commission was not 
neutral in adjudicating the baker’s religious claim.102 
While Phillips technically won as the ruling against him was 
reversed, the narrow animosity finding was the Court’s way of avoiding a 
winner-take-all decision that forced the losing side to suffer “undue 
disrespect” or be subject to “indignities.”103 
B. The Broader Formula for Legislative Accommodations in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop 
Although the Court’s holding in Masterpiece Cakeshop was narrow, 
the opinion can be read as a plea for legislative accommodations. By not 
deciding the big issue in the case, the Court avoided declaring one side 
the big winner and the other side the big loser and left open the 
opportunity for the issue to be decided through the legislative process in 
a way that satisfied both parties. 
The Court began its analysis by recognizing the importance of 
protecting the civil rights of same-sex couples as well as the views and 
97. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1731. 
98. Id. at 1728 (citing Jack v. Gateaux, Ltd., Colo. Civ. Rights Div. Charge No. P20140071X, 
“Determination” (Mar. 24, 2015); Jack v. Le Bakery Sensual, Inc., Colo. Civ. Rights Div. Charge No. 
P20140070X, “Determination” (Mar. 24, 2015); Jack v. Azucar Bakery, Colo. Civ. Rights Div. 
Charge No. P20140069X, “Determination” (Mar. 24, 2015)).  
99. Id. at 1729. 
100.  Id. (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument p. 11–12). 
101.  Id. (citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993)).  
102.  Id. at 1732. 
103.  Id. 
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(“in some instances”) expression of those who have religious objections 
to same-sex marriage.104 It recognized the “general rule” that religious 
objections do not overcome neutral and generally applicable public 
accommodations laws105 but also assumed that it would be a denial of free 
exercise protections to compel a member of the clergy who opposes same-
sex marriage to perform the wedding ceremony for a same-sex couple.106 
The Court then came to the difficulty behind the issue in the case. “Yet if 
that exception were not confined, then a long list of persons who provide 
goods and services for gay marriages and weddings might refuse to do so 
for gay persons, thus resulting in a community-wide stigma inconsistent 
with the history and dynamics of civil rights laws.”107 
After discussing the finding of animosity toward Phillips, the Court 
closed the opinion with a formula for how this issue should be resolved in 
the future. It stated, “[T]hese disputes must be resolved [1] with tolerance, 
[2] without undue disrespect to sincere religious beliefs, and [3] without 
subjecting gay persons to indignities when they seek goods and services 
in an open market.”108 The following sections will contend that the best 
method of balancing the rights of same-sex couples and religious 
objectors would be through legislative accommodations that incorporate 
these three principles. 
IV. THE ADVANTAGES OF LEGISLATIVE ACCOMMODATIONS OVER
JUDICIAL ACCOMMODATIONS 
Historically, the Court has been reluctant to grant religious 
accommodations under the Free Exercise Clause, especially when the 
accommodations infringed on someone else’s rights or liberties.109 Justice 
Scalia’s analysis of the Court’s free exercise jurisprudence in Smith 
104.  Id. at 1727. 
 105.  Id. (citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.8 (1968) (per 
curiam) (noting that defendant’s beliefs that the law requiring the restaurant to serve African 
Americans “contravene[d] the will of God” and violated his free exercise of religion were patently 
frivolous); Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 572 
(1995) (“Provisions like these are well within the State’s usual power to enact when a legislature has 
reason to believe that a given group is the target of discrimination, and they do not, as a general matter, 
violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments.”); see also Emp’t. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 
(1990) (“[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 
‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) 
conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’”) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 
263 n.3 (1982)). 
106.  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1727. 
107.  Id. 
108.  Id. at 1732. 
109.  See supra Section I.B (discussing the Supreme Court’s treatment of free exercise claims).  
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pointed out the consistency with which the Court denied religious 
accommodations.110 He noted the only times the Court has upheld claims 
for religious accommodations were for unemployment compensation 
where the government had already instituted secular accommodations111 
or hybrid claims that combined freedom of speech, association, or press 
with the freedom of religion.112 In holding that neutral and generally 
applicable laws would ordinarily survive free exercise claims, Smith 
recognized that the main avenue for religious accommodations would be 
through legislation.113 In fact, a 1992 study conducted by James Ryan 
concluded that state and federal statutes contained an estimated 2,000 
religious accommodations.114 While this is a rough ballpark number, it 
shows the more influential role of legislative accommodations when 
compared to the minimal number of judicial accommodations of religion. 
This is not to say that judicial accommodations of religion are not 
appropriate in certain situations. That is the role of judicial review. 
However, the distinct line drawing and balancing required to resolve these 
disputes would better be accomplished by the legislature. The 
constitutional principle of separation of powers favors legislative 
accommodations of religion in two ways. First, Congress’s Constitutional 
authority to create law makes legislative accommodations of religion 
more legitimate than judicial accommodations. Second, the legislative 
process makes Congress more competent than the courts to create 
religious accommodations. 
A. The Greater Legitimacy of Legislative Accommodations 
It is elementary that the idea of separation of powers is one of the 
hallmarks of the American form of government. While separation of 
powers is not specifically enumerated in the Constitution, the structure of 
that foundational document illustrates the belief of James Madison that, 
“The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in 
the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, . . . may justly be 
110.  Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–85 (1990). 
111.  Id. at 884 (citing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)). 
112.  Id. at 881–82; supra note 57 and accompanying text. See also Telescope Media Grp. v. 
Lucero, 936 F.3d, 740, 762 (8th Cir. 2019) (reversing dismissal and allowing wedding videographer’s 
case to proceed as hybrid speech and religion claim). 
 113.  See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (citing the Arizona, Colorado, and New Mexico laws that had 
granted accommodations for sacramental peyote use). 
 114.  Culture Wars, supra note 12, at 844–45 (2014) (citing James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1445 (1992)). 
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pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”115 Madison concluded, “[T]he 
preservation of liberty requires that the three great departments of power 
should be separate and distinct.”116 This is why the Constitution vests all 
legislative powers only in Congress117 and judicial power only in the 
courts.118 
Congress is the people’s branch. The 435 Representatives in the 
House and 100 Senators are elected directly by the people and are 
accountable to the people for re-election at the end of their term. The 
actions of these members of Congress is believed to represent the will of 
the people. 
The legislative process is intentionally designed to make sure only 
the best and most popular bills become law, thus giving the law 
legitimacy. The bicameral structure of Congress requires the bill to pass 
two separate chambers—the House of Representatives and the Senate. 
Public debate occurs in the hearings of committees of both the House and 
the Senate as well as on the floor of both chambers. There are numerous 
places in each chamber where a bill could be defeated. The relatively few 
bills that make it through and receive a majority vote in both chambers 
are then presented to the President for his approval or veto before 
becoming law. This laborious process of bicameral approval and 
presentment give laws legitimacy.119 It is true that this process makes it 
difficult to pass bills without using much political will, especially in the 
polarized political environment of our day, but that does not mean that it 
is impossible.120 The result of this legislative process rarely satisfies 
everyone, but it allows those who disagree with the new law to take 
 115.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 298 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). See also 
Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Lecture: Politicians in Robes: The Separation of Powers and the Problem 
of Judicial Legislation, 101 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 31, 35–36 (2015) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 124 (1976) (“The principle of separation of powers was not simply an abstract generalization 
in the minds of the Framers: it was woven into the document they drafted in Philadelphia in the 
summer of 1787.”)). 
116.  THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 298 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  
117.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.  
118.  Id. at art. III, § 1. 
119.  See O’Scannlain, supra note 115, at 37.  
120.  See Kelsey Dallas, What does it take to craft compromise legislation on religious freedom 
and LGBT rights? In Boise, policymakers search for an answer, DESERET NEWS (Feb. 22, 2019), 
https://www.deseretnews.com/article/900057139/what-does-it-take-to-craft-compromise-
legislation-on-religious-freedom-and-lgbt-rights-heres-what-we-learned-in-boise.html 
[https://perma.cc/B55R-4JYL]; Sen. Hill: No Add the Words Legislation This Session, IDAHO NEWS 
(Feb. 21, 2019), https://idahonews.com/news/local/sen-hill-no-add-the-words-legislation-this-
session [https://perma.cc/2F8W-LM7H] (providing Idaho Senator Brent Hill’s full statement on 
compromise legislation and responses from local groups).  
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confidence in the fairness of the system and gives them the opportunity to 
change the law in the future.121 
The Supreme Court was not designed to specialize in making law. It 
was designed to decide “cases” and “controversies”122 and exercise 
judicial review to ensure laws are not “repugnant to the Constitution.”123 
It is true that by way of judicial review the Court recognizes exceptions 
not previously in the law or voids portions of the law thereby creating new 
law.124 As discussed already, this is true even in free exercise 
jurisprudence.125 This paper is not arguing that the Court cannot make 
law, although there may be a place for that argument elsewhere. This 
paper is arguing that the legislative branch is the better option.126 The 
Supreme Court is not the best forum to create religious exemptions in 
these disputes as its structure does not provide the legitimacy that comes 
from the legislative branch. 
The Supreme Court is filled with nine justices who are appointed for 
life-long terms. These justices are not accountable to anyone for their 
decisions. They do not have to answer to the people nor listen to public 
opinion as they are not elected. This insulation is good when justices are 
meant to fairly and neutrally decide cases and controversies or even strike 
down laws that violate the Constitution. There is no outside pressure. This 
insulation is bad when justices significantly alter public policy and make 
law. It removes the people as the source of power and allows for the 
tyranny Madison described.127 Under the Constitution, there is no 
legitimacy in our laws when our lawmakers are not accountable to the 
people. 
121.  See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2625 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
122.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
123.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803).  
124.  McConnell, supra note 15, at 1444–45, 1509–10 (1990) (arguing that the ability of courts 
to create exemptions and accommodations stems from their power of judicial review. Once the court 
is granted the authority to review the constitutionality of the laws passed by the legislature, the court 
has the authority to determine whether Constitutional protections such as the Free Exercise Clause 
require an accommodation to that law in order for the law to be valid.) 
 125.  See supra notes 35–47 and accompanying text (discussing cases where free exercise claims 
were granted by the Court). 
 126.  Compare Alan Brownstein, Gays, Jews, and Other Strangers in a Strange Land: The Case 
for Reciprocal Accommodation of Religious Liberty and the Right of Same-Sex Couples to Marry, 45 
U.S. FLA. L. REV. 389, 391 (2010) (noting that Emp’t Div. v. Smith has largely removed religious 
accommodations from the judicial sphere), with Douglas Laycock, The Wedding-Vendor Cases, 41 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 49, 59 (2018) [hereinafter Wedding-Vendor Cases] (recognizing that 
legislators are unwilling or unable to create accommodations for politically unpopular religions such 
as Muslims or even “conservative Christians in blue states”).  
127.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 115, at 298. 
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B. The Greater Competency of Legislative Accommodations 
The legislative process is designed to make sure the bills competently 
solve the issues they are designed to remedy. House and Senate 
committees hold public hearings and invite testimony from experts to 
educate the members on the issue and potential ways to solve it. Members 
may offer amendments to a bill to reflect technical knowledge or public 
opinion gained during both formal and informal political debate. Congress 
is given wide latitude to review any information, statistic, or circumstance 
when fashioning the bill, and it will often use the input given to precisely 
define the provisions of the new law giving the public a clear 
understanding of the new law’s requirements. This attention to detail and 
ability to incorporate input from a myriad of perspectives provides 
competence to the law. 
The restriction of the Supreme Court to decide cases and 
controversies reduces the Court’s competence when it decides to make 
laws. When a law is made, Congress starts with a clean slate and fashions 
the law to remedy the situation adding different provisions to ensure the 
law solves any problems created by the right or restriction and addresses 
everyone’s concerns. On the other hand, the Court is a “blunt instrument” 
that is limited to the current set of facts before it.128 It does not have the 
same freedom to create law with precision. It must create the law around 
the current set of facts and wait for another case to fill in any gaps. The 
doctrine of stare decisis also theoretically limits the options available to 
the Court by requiring the Court to follow or rationalize the new law with 
its prior decisions, even though in practice the Court has occasionally 
ignored this duty.129 These restrictions to cases and controversies lower 
the competence of judge-made law. 
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Supreme Court would have been 
limited to deciding whether a baker was allowed to decline to bake a 
custom wedding cake for a same-sex marriage. If it wanted to broaden the 
accommodation, the Court might have been able to decide whether 
wedding vendors were able to decline to provide services for same-sex 
128.  See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2625 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 129.  Compare Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 
1018–19 (2003) (citing Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (“[E]ven in 
constitutional cases, the doctrine [of stare decisis] carries such persuasive force that we have always 
required a departure from precedent to be supported by some ‘special justification.’”)) with 
Christopher J. Peters, Under-the-Table Overruling, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 1067, 1072 (2008) (pointing 
out that the recent Supreme Court trend of “underruling,” ruling against recent precedent without 
acknowledging that it was overruling the precedent or rationalizing the change in doctrine, is 
undermining the practical effect of stare decisis).  
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marriages. However without another case presenting a different set of 
facts, the Court would not have been able to adequately define which 
wedding vendors the accommodation applied to or any restrictions on 
what kind of services were covered by the accommodation. Further, the 
Court would be limited in the protections it could provide for same-sex 
couples to the facts of the case. To create further precision in the 
accommodation, the Court would have to wait for another case with the 
proper set of facts. The legislative branch is far more competent in 
creating religious accommodations. 
V. MODERN PROPOSALS AND EXAMPLES OF LEGISLATIVE 
ACCOMMODATIONS 
A. Possible Legislative Accommodations that Satisfy Masterpiece 
Cakeshop’s Formula 
Legislative accommodations of religion are nothing new. As we have 
seen, they have been used since before the Revolution and roughly 2,000 
are in effect today.130 In implementing Masterpiece Cakeshop’s formula 
for solving this issue, what accommodations should be given and what 
lines should be drawn to ensure tolerance and respect for both sides? This 
section will examine three proposed approaches. 
1. Religious Liberty Professors’ Approach to Accommodations
Professors Thomas C. Berg, Robin Fretwell Wilson, and others have 
worked together to draft a proposed religious accommodation in the realm 
of same-sex marriage. It reads: 
No individual, no religious corporation, association or organization, and 
no nonprofit organization owned, controlled or operated by a bona fide 
religious corporation shall be penalized or denied benefits under the 
laws of this state or any subdivision of this state, including but not 
limited to laws regarding employment discrimination, housing, public 
accommodations, licensing, government grants or contracts, or tax-
exempt status, for refusing to provide services, accommodations, 
advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges related to the solemnization 
of any marriage, for refusing to solemnize any marriage, or for refusing 
to treat as valid any marriage, where such providing, solemnizing, or 
treating as valid would cause that individual, corporation, association or 
130.  See supra Sections I.A and I.C and note 114 with accompanying text. 
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organization to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs, provided 
that 
(a) a refusal to provide services, accommodations, advantages, 
facilities, goods, or privileges related to the solemnization of any 
marriage shall not be protected under this section where (i) a party 
to the marriage is unable to obtain any similar services, 
accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges 
elsewhere and (ii) such inability to obtain similar services, 
accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges 
elsewhere constitutes a substantial hardship; and 
(b) no government official may refuse to solemnize a marriage if 
another government official is not available and willing to do so.131 
This “marriage conscience protection” was drafted before the 
Supreme Court recognized same-sex marriage and was advocated to be 
included when a state recognized same-sex marriage.132 These professors 
recognized that legalizing same-sex marriage without providing for 
religious accommodations would create widespread and unnecessary 
conflict.133 This decade-old argument seems prophetic now that we have 
seen cases like Masterpiece Cakeshop filter through the courts. 
Professor Berg argues that this accommodation should extend 
beyond churches to any religious organization whether it be an 
“educational institution, society, charity, or fraternal organization,” to any 
individual in the scope of employment by these religious organizations, 
and to situations “beyond the marriage ceremony.”134 He also argues that 
these religious accommodations should extend to the commercial sphere 
in a limited context. He notes how small businesses embody the beliefs 
 131.  Letter from Thomas C. Berg, Professor of Law, Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of Law, et al., to 
John Baldacci, Governor, Maine., at 9 (Oct. 5, 2009) [hereinafter Letter from Berg to Governor 
Baldacci], http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/wilson-et-al-to-governor-maine-100509.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5GL9-A9P5]. See also Claims Have in Common, supra note 12; Marc D. Stern, 
Liberty v. Equality; Equality v. Liberty, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 307, 307 (2010); Robin Fretwell 
Wilson, Insubstantial Burdens: The Case for Government Employee Exemptions to Same-Sex 
Marriage Laws, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 318 (2010).  
 132.  Letter from Berg to Governor Baldacci, supra note 131, at 8; Thomas C. Berg, Archive: 
Memos/Letters on Religious Liberty and Same-Sex Marriage, MIRROR OF JUSTICE (Aug. 2, 2009) 
[hereinafter Memos/Letters], https://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2009/08/
memosletters-on-religious-liberty-and-samesex-marriage.html [https://perma.cc/4HQR-ERFB].  
 133.  Letter from Berg to Governor Baldacci, supra note 131, at 2 (citing DOUGLAS LAYCOCK 
ET AL., SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS (Douglas Laycock, 
Anthony R. Picarello, Jr. & Robin Fretwell Wilson, eds., Rowman & Littlefield 2008) (including 
contributions from both supporters and opponents of same-sex marriage) (parenthetical in original 
citation)).  
134.  Claims Have in Common, supra note 12, at 227. 
25
Brown: <i>Masterpiece Cakeshop</i>
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019
202 AKRON LAW REVIEW [53:177 
and identity of their owners and how not accommodating the small 
landlord or wedding photographer is akin to asking these small business 
owners to segment their identity and leave their religion out of their 
business.135 
Professor Douglas Laycock, who supports the type of religious 
accommodation drafted by Professor Berg and others above,136 would 
limit the accommodations to the context of the wedding, marriage, or 
sexual relationship. He would only accommodate small businesses where 
the owner is providing the services personally and only if another vendor 
is available.137 
As provisions (a) and (b) show, the accommodations have limits. If 
the same-sex couple is unable to receive the goods or services from a 
willing provider, the accommodation does not apply, and the religious 
objector is required to provide the goods or services. It is provisions such 
as these that help prevent any potential harmful effects that “subject[] gay 
persons to indignities when they seek goods and services in an open 
market.”138 Professor Berg argues that the two ways to minimize harmful 
effects are notice and alternative providers.139 Providing notice of a 
business’s religious objections before service is requested limits the harm 
to the person’s dignity that comes from a surprise refusal of service. Some 
might argue that refusal via prior notice could cause the same injury that 
refusal in-person causes. This may be true, but if religious objections and 
harm to the dignity of the religious adherent are to be taken seriously in 
the commercial context, religious accommodations would require the 
person to find out about the objections at some point. Receiving notice 
early is better than being refused service in person.140 Requiring 
alternative providers be available also reduces the harm to the person’s 
dignity because it ensures that they are still able to receive the goods or 
services.141 Notice and alternative providers are appropriate limits to 
religious accommodations. 
135.  Id. at 227–28. 
 136.  See Memos/Letters, supra note 132; Letter from Douglas Laycock, Professor of Law, Univ. 
of Mich. Law Sch., to John Baldacci, Governor, Maine, at 1 (April 30, 2009), 
https://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/maineexemptionsbaldacci1.doc [https://perma.cc/8DPG-
BGSC]. 
137.  Wedding-Vendor Cases, supra note 126, at 63.  
138.  Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1732 (2018). 
139.  Thomas C. Berg, A Case for Accommodating Religious Nonprofits, 91 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1341, 1369 (2016) [hereinafter Accommodating Religious Nonprofits] (arguing for religious 
accommodations in the context of providing contraception). 
140.  Id. at 1369–71 (2016); See also Laycock, Wedding-Vendor Cases, supra note 126, at 63–
64. 
141.  Accommodating Religious Nonprofits, supra note 139, at 1371. 
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2. Professor Brownstein’s “Religious Discrimination” Approach
to Religious Accommodations
Professor Alan Brownstein has offered a different model for 
approaching whether to provide a religious accommodation. He refers to 
it as the religious discrimination model. This approach would provide a 
religious accommodation to situations involving same-sex marriage if a 
comparable accommodation would be allowed if the situation involved 
differences in religion.142 
For example, under Professor Brownstein’s approach, a religious 
school or other educational organization that is permitted to discriminate 
on the basis of religion for admission would similarly be allowed to refuse 
admission to an LGBT individual. However, a religious hospital who 
would not be able to refuse to treat someone of another religion would not 
be allowed to refuse to treat someone based on their sexual orientation.143 
In the commercial context, Professor Brownstein uses the example 
of how a hotel turning away its honeymoon suite to a Jewish or Muslim 
couple would be deemed unacceptable. So to, then, must it be 
unacceptable for a hotel to refuse to rent its honeymoon suite to a same-
sex couple.144 When it comes to same-sex weddings, the “religious 
discrimination” approach would ask “whether we would protect the same 
class of proprietors from being required to assist in or promote the 
solemnization or celebration or any religious life cycle event.”145 
Professor Brownstein offers the example of a florist and admits the 
potential of a local florist refusing to serve him because of his Jewish 
beliefs is “an unpalatable prospect.”146 
In the implementation of those accommodations deemed valid under 
his “religious discrimination” approach, Professor Brownstein argues that 
the government should assume the responsibility of compiling 
information about who has religious objections. He sees this as the way 
of limiting dignitary harm to same-sex couples.147 He also places the 
burden on the government to provide alternatives for healthcare that is 
denied due to a religious objection from the employer.148 In this aspect, 
Professor Brownstein accurately predicted the factual result of Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby which granted a religious accommodation to closely-held, 
142.  Brownstein, supra note 126, at 422. 
143.  Id. at 425–26. 
144.  Id. at 429. 
145.  Id. at 431. 
146.  Id.  
147.  Id. at 436. 
148.  Id. 
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for-profit corporations who objected to the contraceptive mandate in the 
Affordable Care Act.149 
Professor Brownstein’s “religious discrimination” approach is more 
of a theory model behind religious objections rather than a concrete 
approach. He even describes it as a model and recognizes that it does not 
provide all the answers.150 However, it does provide us with a way for 
those who can only see the debate from their side to gain a different 
perspective by rephrasing the issue.151 
3. The Government’s Approach in its Masterpiece Cakeshop
amicus brief
Interestingly, the United States submitted an amicus brief in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop and the Solicitor General participated in oral 
argument in support of religious accommodations for the baker.152 
Understanding that this approach for religious accommodations was made 
within the limited scope of a case before the Supreme Court, we may still 
pull out principles to help us in forming legislative accommodations. 
Like most arguments favoring the baker in this case, the 
government’s argument focused on the religious objection to the 
compelled expression of celebrating the same-sex wedding.153 At oral 
argument, the Solicitor General offered the analogy of compelling the 
religious baker to create a custom wedding cake for a same-sex marriage 
to compelling an African-American sculptor to create a cross for a Ku 
Klux Klan service.154 The government’s preferred test proposed that only 
activities that compel “[1] expression and [2] participation in an 
expressive event” should be subject to heightened scrutiny.155 This 
accommodation applies only to those who satisfy both elements. This test 
eliminates certain wedding vendors such as venues, transportation 
services, and lodging.156 The government argued that the baker in this case 
satisfied both elements as he created a custom wedding cake which can 
be likened “to a sculptural centerpiece” that symbolizes the celebration of 
149.  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 736 (2014). 
150.  Brownstein, supra note 126, at 423. 
151.  Id. at 423–24. 
152.  Brief for the United States, supra note 95. 
153.  Id. at 14. 
154.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 95, at 26–27. 
155.  Brief for the United States, supra note 95, at 14. 
156.  Id. at 21–22. 
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the wedding, and the cake’s central role in the celebration is likened to the 
artist participating in the event.157 
Because this was a legal argument designed to persuade the Supreme 
Court, it mirrors the “hybrid claim” analysis in Smith.158 In this case, the 
government is arguing for a hybrid between freedom of religion and 
freedom of speech. 
The principle of not compelling someone to “speak” and participate 
in an event they are opposed to provides, at minimum, a baseline for 
creating religious accommodations.159 
B. Modern Examples of Legislative Accommodations for Religion 
There are several modern examples of legislative accommodations 
for religion that relate to same-sex marriage and LGBT. These examples 
show how the legislature was able to bring both sides together to create a 
solution that worked for everyone. No one was able to get everything they 
wanted, but both sides were protected from significantly losing. These 
examples include the Utah Compromise, Rowan County Clerk Kim 
Davis, and accommodations in North Carolina, Georgia, and Mississippi. 
1. Utah Compromise
The Utah Compromise is the name given to a pair of bills passed by 
the State of Utah in 2015 just a few months prior to the Supreme Court’s 
recognition of same-sex marriage in Obergefell.160 This bipartisan effort 
passed both LGBT and religious freedom protections. Some of the 
specific accommodations include protections for LGBT individuals from 
housing and employment discrimination while allowing employers to 
determine reasonable dress standards and designate sex-specific 
facilities.161 It also allows religious and small employers to use religious 
principles in hiring. The compromise protects equally the freedom of 
speech for both groups in the workplace.162 It allows religious 
organizations who own housing facilities to give preference to those of 
157.  Id. at 24–27, 29. 
 158.  Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990). See also supra notes 57, 95, and 112 
and accompanying text. 
159.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 95, at 45–46. 
160.  See Antidiscrimination and Religious Freedom Amendments, 2015 Utah Laws 68–82; 
Protections for Religious Expression and Beliefs about Marriage, Family, or Sexuality, 2015 Utah 
Laws 214–18. 
161.  Antidiscrimination and Religious Freedom Amendments, 2015 Utah Laws 68–82. 
162.  Id. 
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their own faith and for small landlords to use their personal preference in 
choosing tenants.163 
Some of the biggest aspects of the Utah Compromise are the 
recognition of same-sex marriage and the corresponding protection for 
those who advocate for traditional marriage.164 Under this law, religious 
officials cannot be compelled to perform weddings against their religious 
beliefs. Religious organizations cannot be forced to use their facilities for 
weddings that are contrary to their faith and cannot lose their tax-exempt 
status for refusing to participate in such weddings.165 Individuals who 
speak their views on marriage, family, and sexuality outside of 
professional settings cannot lose their professional license.166 
While this type of bargaining for same-sex recognition is no longer 
available now that the Supreme Court has recognized same-sex marriage 
as a fundamental right, the concept of bringing both sides together to find 
a compromise is still viable. This is exactly what the Court called for in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop—”[T]hese disputes must be resolved with 
tolerance, without undue disrespect to sincere religious beliefs, and 
without subjecting gay persons to indignities when they seek goods and 
services in an open market.”167 Legislatures can still pass laws that define 
when someone with religious objections to participating in a same-sex 
wedding may be exempt from complying with generally-applicable anti-
discrimination laws and that also ensure same-sex couples have the ability 
to receive services in the open market. 
2. Rowan County Clerk Kim Davis
Besides Masterpiece Cakeshop, the most widely recognized instance 
of a same-sex couple being denied service for their wedding involves Kim 
Davis, the county clerk in Rowan County, Kentucky. This case is a prime 
example of how an accommodation by the legislature calmed an intense 
battle in the courts. In the end, both sides claimed victory.168 
Upon learning of the Supreme Court’s recognition of same-sex 
marriage in Obergefell, Davis refused to issue any marriage licenses from 
163.  Id. 
 164.  Protections for Religious Expression and Beliefs about Marriage, Family, or Sexuality, 
2015 Utah Laws 214–218. 
165.  Id. 
166.  Id. 
167.  Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1732 (2018). 
168.  See Corky Siemaszko, Kentucky Clerk Kim Davis, Who Refused to Issue Marriage 
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her office citing her religious beliefs against same-sex marriage.169 
Marriage licenses in Kentucky included an authorization statement of the 
county clerk recognizing the couple on the license is authorized to 
marry.170 Davis believed this authorization statement combined with her 
name as county clerk on the form served as an endorsement of same-sex 
marriage.171 When a lawsuit arose, the district court denied Davis’ free 
exercise claim and issued an injunction against her requiring her to issue 
marriage licenses.172 Despite the injunction, Davis continued to refuse to 
issue marriage licenses. The district court judge held Davis in contempt 
and placed her in jail.173 
In response, the Kentucky General Assembly amended the 
requirements of the marriage license. The license no longer needed to 
contain the name of the county clerk and could be signed by a deputy-
clerk.174 Since the new legislation resolved Davis’s objections, the Sixth 
Circuit dismissed the appeal as being moot and ordered the district court 
to vacate the injunction.175 Kim Davis and all other Kentucky county 
clerks received an accommodation from the Kentucky legislature as they 
no longer had to personally authorize same-sex marriages, and same-sex 
couples in Rowan County and across the state were assured they could 
obtain a marriage license at their local county clerk’s office. A simple 
adjustment to the law by the legislature created an amicable conclusion to 
a passionate court battle. 
3. North Carolina’s Accommodations
Just weeks before the Supreme Court recognized same-sex marriage 
in Obergefell, the North Carolina legislature passed a law over the 
governor’s veto that provided for accommodations for magistrates to 
recuse themselves from performing all marriages and assistant or deputy 
registrar of deeds to recuse themselves from issuing all marriage 
certificates.176 The text does not mention the registrar of deeds which 
implies the accommodation only applies to assistants and deputies. The 
law also provided for the Administrative Office of the Courts to ensure 
169.  Miller v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 924, 929 (E.D. Ky. 2015).  
170.  Id. at 931. 
171.  Id. at 932. 
172.  Id. at 944. 
173.  See Alan Blinder & Tamar Lewin, Clerk in Kentucky Chooses Jail Over Deal on Same-Sex 
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/us/kim-davis-same-
sex-marriage.html [https://perma.cc/X8UA-NAAU]. 
174.  See 2016 Ky. Acts 132. 
175.  Miller v. Davis, 667 F. App’x 537, 538 (6th Cir. 2016). 
176.  See 2015 N.C. Sess. Laws 75, § 1(a)–(b).  
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that all jurisdictions had access to a magistrate willing to perform 
marriages.177 This compromise gave government employees with 
religious objections to same-sex marriage an accommodation while 
ensuring same-sex couples the ability to receive marriage licenses and to 
solemnize their marriage. 
4. One-sided Religious Protections in Response to Obergefell
Several state legislatures passed religious protections as a result of 
the Court’s decision in Obergefell. Legislatures in Georgia and 
Mississippi passed bills to protect those who had religious beliefs that 
opposed same-sex marriage but did not provide much protection for same-
sex couples. 
Georgia’s legislature passed “An Act to Protect Religious 
Freedoms.” The bill would have provided significant protections for those 
who had religious objections to same-sex marriage including members of 
the clergy and faith-based organizations.178 It also served as a state 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act that would have required the 
compelling government interest test for a burden by the state on a person’s 
exercise of religion.179 After Coca-Cola, Disney, the NFL, and other major 
corporations threatened a boycott of the state, Georgia Governor Nathan 
Deal vetoed the bill.180 
Georgia’s religious freedom bill likely would have been more 
accepted if it had listed provisions that specifically protected same-sex 
couples. Because it only offered specific protections to religious 
objectors, it became extremely unpopular and was vetoed. 
Mississippi passed the “Protecting Freedom of Conscience from 
Government Discrimination Act” in 2016.181 This law recognized the 
sincerely held religious belief of traditional marriage.182 It also prevented 
the state from discriminating against religious organizations who make 
certain decisions due to the organizations’ belief in traditional marriage.183 
Among other things, the law prevented the state from discriminating 
177.  Id. at § 1(c). 
 178.  See Free Exercise Protection Act, Ga. Gen. Assemb., H.B. 757, 2015–2016 Gen. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess., §§ 2, 4 (Ga. 2016). 
179.  Id. at § 6. 
180.  See Ralph Ellis & Emanuella Grinberg, Georgia Gov. Nathan Deal to Veto ‘Religious 
Liberty’ Bill, CNN (Mar. 28, 2016, 5:46PM) https://www.cnn.com/2016/03/28/us/georgia-north-
carolina-lgbt-bills/index.html [https://perma.cc/ZB6X-UU82]. 
 181.  See Protecting Freedom of Conscience from Government Discrimination Act, Miss. Leg., 
H.B. 1523, 2016 Miss. Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2016). 
182.  See id. at § 2. 
183.  See id. at § 3(1). 
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against persons or organizations who use their belief in traditional 
marriage to decline to place foster children with same-sex couples, or to 
provide services for same-sex weddings, or in the case of state employees 
to recuse themselves from authorizing or licensing same-sex marriages.184 
Like Georgia’s law, this Mississippi law did not offer any specific 
protections for the dignity of same-sex couples. 
Those opposed to this new law filed suit claiming that it violated the 
Establishment Clause because section two endorsed a specific religious 
belief and violated the Equal Protection Clause because it provided 
stronger protections for those who believed in traditional marriage than 
those who believed in same-sex marriage. The district court granted a 
preliminary injunction against the law,185 but the Fifth Circuit dismissed 
the case for lack of standing.186 
These laws in Georgia and Mississippi faced much opposition and 
did little to resolve the overall dispute. Had these laws been closer to 
Utah’s laws which provided protections for both sides, they would have 
had wider support and satisfied Masterpiece Cakeshop’s formula for 
finding a balance between same-sex rights and religious rights. 
When it comes to existing religious accommodations, there are some 
that have provided a good balance of protections for both same-sex 
couples and religious objectors, and there are others that have provided 
lopsided protections. Those that are balanced have been accepted while 
those that are lopsided have faced significant political pressure and legal 
challenges. To truly solve the dispute, they “must be resolved with 
tolerance, without undue disrespect to sincere religious beliefs, and 
without subjecting gay persons to indignities when they seek goods and 
services in an open market.”187 
VI. THE APPLICATION OF LEGISLATIVE ACCOMMODATIONS TO
CURRENT AND FUTURE ISSUES 
The legislature, whether state or federal, has broad power to 
accommodate religion. However, we have seen that when a legislature 
goes too far in protecting religious objectors without also expressing 
tolerance and protecting the dignity of LGBT individuals, the situation is 
not resolved and usually escalates. Masterpiece Cakeshop’s formula has 
proven to be needed. 
184.  See id. at § 3. 
185.  Barber v. Bryant, 193 F. Supp. 3d 677, 724 (S.D. Miss. 2016). 
186.  Barber v. Bryant, 860 F.3d 345, 358 (5th Cir. 2017). 
187.  Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1732 (2018). 
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This article has shown how three different proposals—from the 
religious liberty professors, Professor Brownstein, and the government—
uniquely satisfy the formula of resolving these disputes “with tolerance, 
without undue disrespect to sincere religious beliefs, and without 
subjecting gay persons to indignities when they seek goods and services 
in an open market.”188 
Moving forward, how can we use this these proposals and the 
formula from Masterpiece Cakeshop to resolve this dispute? There are 
three main categories that are currently still being debated: wedding 
vendors, adoption agencies, and government officials. 
A. Wedding Vendors 
The most current issue is the one unanswered by Masterpiece 
Cakeshop—whether wedding vendors, or any particular type of wedding 
vendor, are able to refuse to serve a same-sex wedding. Masterpiece 
Cakeshop’s formula implies that there should be at least some 
compromise by both sides. The religious liberty professor’s approach 
would accommodate wedding vendors as long as there are other vendors 
available to provide those services without substantial hardship. Professor 
Brownstein’s “religious discrimination” model is unclear but does allow 
for both sides to see from the other’s perspective. The government’s 
approach would exempt only those whose goods or services are 
considered expressive and providing that good or service would require 
them to participate in the expressive event. 
Assuming that all of these vendors are small business owners, bakers 
who create custom wedding cakes should receive an accommodation 
under any of these approaches. Wedding photographers would also 
receive accommodations as their photography is expressive and requires 
them to participate in the event. A florist would also fall into this category. 
Whether other vendors such as limousine companies, party supply 
companies, and non-religious venues received an accommodation would 
depend on which approach is used. These vendors are not typically 
considered to provide expressive services. Therefore, they would not 
likely receive an accommodation under the government’s approach. They 
would also not likely be able to refuse service based on religion, failing 
Professor Brownstein’s approach. However, under the religious liberty 
professor’s model accommodation, these services would likely be 
included. 
188.  Id. 
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Masterpiece Cakeshop has shown us that to resolve these bitter 
disputes there needs to be respect for sincere religious beliefs and the 
dignity of same-sex couples. The current case law and the structure and 
inflexibility of the courts make it difficult to create judicial 
accommodations. It is time for the legislature to step up and resolve these 
disputes with religious accommodations designed to protect both the 
wedding vendors and the same-sex couples. How the legislature draws 
that line will likely rely on its political makeup and which approach to 
accommodations it uses, but it is certain that some sort of compromise is 
needed. 
B. Judges, Magistrates, and Other Government Officials 
Judges, magistrates, and other government officials involved in the 
recognition of marriage are another group who face a challenge between 
their faith and their role in performing same-sex marriages.189 
County clerks have already been discussed. Kentucky was able to 
provide an accommodation for Kim Davis,190 and North Carolina passed 
an accommodation that allowed assistant and deputy register of deeds to 
recuse themselves from processing marriage licenses.191 However, there 
are clerks in other states who have not received religious 
accommodations. Linda Summers, a deputy clerk from Indiana, was fired 
when she refused to process a same-sex marriage license. Her civil rights 
lawsuit was dismissed, finding that she was not dismissed for her religious 
beliefs but for failing to do her job.192 There is nothing more needed than 
political will to enact meaningful religious accommodations for county 
clerks that also protect same-sex couples. 
Judges and magistrates have a harder argument to make for religious 
accommodations. Several states have issued advisory opinions stating the 
requirement of judges to perform same-sex marriages. Three days after 
the Supreme Court recognized same-sex marriage, the Nebraska Judicial 
Ethics Committee issued an advisory opinion stating that a judge who 
performs traditional marriages will not be allowed to refuse to perform 
 189.  See also Christopher T. Holinger, Note, When Fundamental Rights Collide, Will We 
Tolerate Dissent? Why a Judge Who Declines to Solemnize a Same-Sex Wedding Should Not Be 
Punished, 29 REGENT U. L. REV. 365, 365 (2016–2017).  
190.  See 2016 Ky. Acts 132; supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
191.  See 2015 N.C. Sess. Laws 75. 
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same-sex marriages.193 While performing marriages is an “extrajudicial 
activity,” the ethics committee decided that a refusal to perform a same-
sex wedding even for religious objections would “undermine the judge’s 
independence, integrity, and impartiality.”194 The Supreme Court of Ohio 
Board of Professional Conduct issued an advisory opinion stating that 
judges may not refuse to perform same-sex marriages but also went a step 
farther by stating that any judge who stops performing any marriage to 
avoid having to perform same-sex marriages has also manifested bias.195 
The Wisconsin Judicial Conduct Advisory Committee also issued an 
advisory opinion stating that a judge who performs any marriages may not 
refuse to perform same-sex marriages.196 While these opinions are 
nonbinding, they show the intricacies of providing religious 
accommodations for judges. 
There have been a few cases of judges facing discipline for refusing 
to perform same-sex marriages. One case involved Judge Ruth Neely of 
Wyoming who, in response to a reporter’s question regarding her 
enthusiasm for performing same-sex marriages, stated that she would not 
be able to perform same-sex marriages due to her religious beliefs. She 
was never asked to perform a same-sex marriage.197 The Wyoming 
Supreme Court, applying strict scrutiny, found that promoting the 
integrity of the judiciary was a compelling interest198 and disciplining her 
with a public censure is the least restrictive method of upholding judicial 
integrity.199 The dissent viewed the case as one imposing a religious test 
on judges.200 They claim the majority’s compelling interest in protecting 
the integrity of the judiciary is overbroad and unfounded on the facts of 
the case.201 The dissent also points to the judicial rules which allow 
reassignment of cases to avoid partiality as a less burdensome method of 
promoting judicial integrity in this situation.202 
 193.  Neb. Jud. Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 15-1, 2 (2015), https://supremecourt.nebraska.gov/
sites/default/files/ethics-opinions/Judicial/15-1_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/FNH4-XT23]. 
194.  Id. at 2. 
 195.  See Ohio Bd. Of Prof’l Conduct, Formal Op. 2015-1, 7 (2015), 
https://www.ohioadvop.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Op_15-001.pdf [https://perma.cc/6SDE-
9QAT]. 
196.  Wis. Jud. Conduct Advisory Comm., Formal Op. No. 15-1, 4–5 (2015), 
https://www.wicourts.gov/sc/judcond/DisplayDocument.pdf?content=pdf&seqNo=146878 
[https://perma.cc/W56C-R2YH]. 
197.  Neely v. Wyo. Comm’n on Jud. Conduct & Ethics, 390 P.3d 728, 734 (Wyo. 2017). 
198.  Id. at 736. 
199.  Id. at 753. 
200.  Id. at 753–54 (Kautz, J., dissenting). 
201.  Id. at 767 (Kautz J., dissenting). 
202.  Id. 
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Another case involved Judge Vance D. Day of Oregon who 
instructed his staff to search the local judicial database to determine if the 
couples requesting to be married were same-sex. If they were, Judge Day 
instructed his staff to politely inform the couple that the judge was 
unavailable at the requested time as he was religiously opposed to same-
sex marriage.203 The Commission on Judicial Fitness and Disability 
charged Judge Day with manifesting bias or prejudice in his judicial duties 
and failure to perform judicial duties along with eleven other counts for 
unrelated incidents.204 The Oregon Supreme Court held that Judge Day’s 
screening process manifested prejudice in the performance of his judicial 
duties,205 but declined to consider Judge Day’s constitutional defense. The 
court noted that the findings on the other counts justified the sanction and 
the answer to the unsettled constitutional question would not change the 
outcome.206 
The third case involved Magistrate Sandra Myrick of North Carolina 
who requested a religious accommodation after federal district courts 
overruled North Carolina law and required same-sex marriage be treated 
the same as opposite-sex marriages.207 Judicial administrators in North 
Carolina distributed memos requiring judges, clerks, and magistrates to 
perform same-sex marriages or face discipline.208 Her supervisors, 
believing the directives from judicial administrators left them no ability 
to accommodate, accepted Magistrate Myrick’s resignation.209 She filed a 
claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The 
Administrative Law Judge held that the state discriminated against her 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for not accommodating 
her religious belief.210 
While the advisory opinions and disciplinary decisions do not favor 
accommodations for judges and magistrates, the North Carolina law that 
accommodated assistant and deputy register of deeds also allows 
magistrates to recuse themselves from performing all marriages and 
provides a willing magistrate should a jurisdiction not have one 
203.  In re Day, 413 P.3d 907, 921–22 (Or. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 324 (2018). 
204.  Id. at 922. 
205.  Id. at 949–53. 
206.  Id. at 953–54. 
207.  Myrick v. Warren, No. 16-EEOC-0001, at *5 (Mar. 8, 2017) https://s3.amazonaws.com/
becketnewsite/Myrick-v.-Warren-et.-al.-16-EEOC-0001.pdf [https://perma.cc/TSG6-GL64] 
(predating the Supreme Courts recognition of same-sex marriage in Obergefell). 
208.  Id. at *8. 
209.  Id. at *9. 
210.  Id. at *10, 24. 
37
Brown: <i>Masterpiece Cakeshop</i>
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019
214 AKRON LAW REVIEW [53:177 
available.211 This law, passed after Magistrate Sandra Myrick requested 
her accommodation, proves that judges and magistrates can receive 
accommodations too. 
While judges should be allowed to refuse to perform marriages, 
judges should not be able to recuse themselves from all family court 
proceedings involving same-sex couples. This is what Judge W. Mitchell 
Nance of Kentucky did.212 As a result, Judge Nance was charged with 
judicial misconduct and submitted his resignation. He was found guilty of 
misconduct and issued a public reprimand which was the only sanction 
available due to his retirement.213 This conduct does not protect the 
dignity of same-sex couples nor the impartiality of the judiciary and 
should not be accommodated. 
C. Adoption Agencies 
Judge Nance’s case proves that once the disputes around same-sex 
weddings are resolved, the next issue will center on the family and begin 
with religious adoption agencies. The issue with religious adoption 
agencies declining to place children with same-sex couples is that many 
of these agencies receive government funding or are reliant on 
government contracts to operate as part of the state adoption and foster 
programs. 
There are cases out of Michigan214 and Pennsylvania215 where 
religiously-affiliated adoption agencies are at risk of having to close 
211.  2015 N.C. Sess. Laws 75. 
 212.  Commonwealth of Kentucky Judicial Conduct Commission, Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Final Order, In re Hon. W. Mitchell Nance, at 3 (Dec. 19, 2017), 
https://courts.ky.gov/commissionscommittees/JCC/Documents/Public_Information/FindingsFactsN
ance.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GX3-TLWR]. 
213.  Id. at 5. 
214.  See Dumont v. Lyon, 341 F. Supp. 3d 706 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (denying adoption agency’s 
motion to dismiss and allowing same-sex couples to proceed with establishment clause and equal 
protection clause claims against the state for using religiously-based adoption agencies who do not 
place children with same-sex couples to proceed). Compare, Dumont v. Lyon, BECKET (Sep. 9, 2019), 
https://www.becketlaw.org/case/dumont-v-lyon/ [https://perma.cc/S6PC-EHRH] (providing the 
religious adoption agency’s position), with Dumont v. Lyon, ACLU (March 22, 2019), 
https://www.aclu.org/cases/dumont-v-lyon [https://perma.cc/A244-MDK7] (providing the same-sex 
couples’ position).  
 215.  See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 320 F. Supp. 3d 661 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (denying 
religiously-based adoption agency’s motion for injunction after the City of Philadelphia closed the 
agency’s intake for the agency’s practice of their religious belief), aff’d, 922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019), 
cert granted, No. 19-123 (Feb. 24, 2020). Compare Sharonell Fulton, et al. v. City of Philadelphia, 
BECKET (Feb. 2, 2019), https://www.becketlaw.org/case/sharonell-fulton-et-al-v-city-philadelphia/ 
[https://perma.cc/FLU4-BUKV] (providing the religious adoption agency’s position), with Fulton v. 
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because they choose to practice their religious beliefs. Religious 
organizations should not be disqualified from assisting the government in 
providing services because of their religious beliefs. Such 
disqualifications would amount to a religious test for public service. Their 
assistance to the government in providing adoption services to their local 
communities should not alter whether or not they should be 
accommodated for their religious beliefs. 
Adoption agencies can be seen like a wedding vendor. Legislatures 
can do a similar analysis to determine whether to provide 
accommodations. The religious liberty professor’s approach would not 
cover adoption agencies as its current form is tailored toward the wedding 
scenario. However, it could be tailored to fit same-sex family situations 
and provide the same kind of protections for same-sex couples and 
religious organizations. 
Professor Brownstein directly addresses the issue of refusing to place 
children with same-sex couples. He concludes that accommodating 
religious adoption agencies would be acceptable. He argues that religious 
agencies are often chosen by birth parents to place children in homes of 
like faith. This allowable refusal based on religion would permit similar 
refusals for same-sex couples provided there are other adoption agencies 
able to assist the same-sex couple.216 
Using the government approach, adoption agencies can be viewed as 
expressing approval that families are well qualified to care for the children 
they are adopting and the adoption process is a very expressive event. 
Religious adoption agencies can also be likened to the wedding vendors 
that provide a standard “off-the-shelf” product which would remove them 
from receiving accommodations. However, the uniqueness and value that 
we place on children would make the act of finding the child the best home 
available an expressive act and the adoption an expressive event. Under 
this approach, religious adoption agencies would receive an 
accommodation. 
Accommodations for religious adoption agencies that receive 
government funds would have Establishment Clause and other statutory 
issues to deal with, but those issues are the subject of another article. 
City of Philadelphia, ACLU (June 10, 2019), https://www.aclu.org/cases/fulton-v-city-philadelphia 
[https://perma.cc/ 632R-HWJH] (providing the same-sex couples’ position). 
216.  Brownstein, supra note 126, at 426–27. 
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VII.CONCLUSION
While Masterpiece Cakeshop did not provide the winner-take-all 
legal solution to the issue of same-sex rights versus religious beliefs that 
was anticipated, it did provide a formula to resolve the dispute in a way 
that worked for both sides. Legislative accommodations are better suited 
than judicial accommodations. Several proposals for legislative 
accommodations have been made, and several examples of legislative 
accommodations have already been enacted. These show that legislative 
accommodations that respect both sides have the ability to provide the 
best solution to our current and future issues regarding free exercise of 
religion and same-sex marriage. 
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